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 Social Science in Humanitarian Action
 Incorporating Non-Expert 
Evidence into Surveillance 
and Early Detection of 
Public Health Emergencies
‘Big data’ has promised significant improvements for the global surveillance of 
infectious disease. This SSHAP Case Study highlights how, over the past two 
decades, new disease surveillance practices built on amassing and processing large 
data sets – analysed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, 
relating to human behaviour and interactions – have been successful in the advanced 
forecasting of deadly disease outbreaks including severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), 
human influenza, the Ebola virus and novel coronavirus (COVID-19). The increasing 
incorporation of non-expert evidence – that is, data that is collected and analysed 
from sources outside of traditional clinical/healthcare sectors into infectious 
disease and public health surveillance practices – must be continually monitored and 
verified as technological capacities and innovation towards the rapid identification of 
public health threats advance.
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The challenge: disease detection 
and the ‘big data’ deluge
Traditionally, the rapid reporting and monitoring 
of emergent infectious diseases was challenged 
by issues of data scarcity and access, as well as 
the conduct of governments in declaring disease 
outbreaks. For example, in 1967-68, during a severe 
outbreak of wild poliomyelitis, the World Health 
Organization (WHO) was unable to obtain correct 
epidemiological and surveillance data from the 
Government of Guinea. Despite reports that over 
200 paralytic cases of polio had occurred within the 
country, WHO efforts to obtain further information 
from the Guinean health authorities during the 
ongoing outbreak were fruitless due to bureaucratic 
time-lags and national sovereignty concerns. It 
eventually took a team of WHO 
consultants seven months to 
gain clearance to enter Guinea 
to assess the emergency. 
Almost four decades on from 
the Guinean polio epidemic, 
the rise of the big data era and 
diffusions of heterogeneous 
digital data sources have 
transformed the practice 
and scope of public health 
surveillance in the age of 
global health security. The first 
shift towards the accessing and incorporation 
of open-source and unofficial data sources into 
the surveillance of emerging pandemic threats 
occurred during the 2002–03 SARS epidemic which 
originated in Guangdong Province, China. 
The programme: big data 
technologies for tracking 
pandemic risks
Unlike previous outbreaks, the emergence of 
SARS occurred alongside the rise of new digital data 
sources and the Internet. In contrast to previous 
public health emergencies, the first initial reporting 
of an unusual occurrence of atypical pneumonia 
circulating in Guangdong did not come from WHO 
or Chinese health officials, but rather from a new 
digital surveillance technology, the Global Public 
Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN), a prototype 
launched by the Government of Canada some years 
earlier. As a new online surveillance technology, 
GPHIN sought to scan digital content online for 
potential indicators of diseases threats. By using 
cutting-edge web-crawling software and digital 
algorithms to collect, sort and classify incoming 
data sets, GPHIN captured the earliest warnings of 
a coming public health emergency in China, several 
months in advance of WHO authorities, and in spite 
of Chinese government efforts to tightly control 
the release of information detailing an unusual 
health event. 
The use of GPHIN to monitor potential epidemics via 
big data sources signalled critical transformations 
in the incorporation of non-expert evidence in the 
surveillance of public health emergencies. It was 
the first demonstration of how digital non-official, 
non-medical data sets captured online could 
provide timely warnings of potential outbreaks in 
pre-epidemic stages. These data could be verified 
alongside medical and scientific evidence and 
updated, uploaded and disseminated in real-time, 
enabling nimbler response capacities by national 
health authorities and intergovernmental health 
agents. The rise and use of new public health 
surveillance techniques, which incorporated non-
expert evidence and big data sources and operated 
across datascapes and the Internet, meant that 
established conventions of disease reporting in the 
era of big data were no longer bilaterally controlled 
by the WHO and its sovereign country members. 
Following the widely cited success of GPHIN in 
detecting outbreaks from new data sources, a range 
of similar big data-driven health surveillance systems 
came into operation from 2003 onward. 
 Over the past two 
decades, new disease 
surveillance practices 
built on amassing and 
processing large data 
sets… have been 
successful in the 
advanced forecasting 
of deadly disease 
outbreaks. 
Social Science in Humanitarian Action
Ca
se
 S
tu
dy
32
In 2006, a new big data surveillance technology 
called HealthMap launched online. Automated 
and sustained by algorithms for its data 
collection, filtration and assessment operations, 
the HealthMap system further expanded new 
techniques of open-source disease surveillance 
by integrating – in HealthMap’s words – ‘disparate 
data sources, including online news aggregators, 
eyewitness reports, expert-curated discussions and 
validated official reports, to achieve a unified and 
comprehensive view of the current global state of 
infectious diseases and their effect on human and 
animal health’ (HealthMap 2020). 
A decade after the SARS outbreak in China, on 14 
March 2014, HealthMap uploaded and disseminated 
a health alert via its website that detailed the 
emergence of a strange 
haemorrhagic fever which 
had emerged in Macenta, 
Guinea. The early forecasting 
of the health episode had been 
detected online from a Guinean 
media report by an algorithm 
within HealthMap’s operating 
system. Nine days later, the 
Guinean Ministry of Health 
gave official notification to 
the WHO of a rapidly evolving 
outbreak of the Ebola Virus 
in the heavily forested areas 
of the country. Soon after, 
an article published in Lancet Infectious Disease 
asserted that it should be a global public health 
priority to encourage countries to adopt, integrate 
and apply such evolving digital surveillance practices 
in order to track and regulate the movement of 
global pandemic risks.
Evolving approaches to harnessing diverse, digital 
big data sources to accelerate infectious disease 
reporting have continued to intensify within health 
security practices over the past five years. During 
the 2016 localised epidemic of MERS-CoV in South 
Korea, the government used machine-learning 
processes based on algorithms to trace suspected 
cases of infections from mobile phone records 
provided by telecommunication companies, and 
to subsequently impose quarantine on 17,000 
citizens. Elsewhere, within the ongoing 2019-20 
Wuhan COVID-19 global pandemic, enormous global 
research interest has peaked in seeking to apply 
artificial intelligence (AI) techniques – including 
machine learning to social media feeds, web content 
and a range of other open-source data sets – to 
seek to track and identify new cases of the virus. 
Within the critical early days of the emergence of 
COVID-19, a Toronto-based start-up company called 
BlueDot, which offers personalised and automated 
disease surveillance, claimed to have successfully 
detected the first initial cases of COVID-19 via the 
company’s automated daily scanning of more than 
100,000 media articles in 65 languages. On 31 
December 2019, BlueDot identified the emergence 
of a ‘pneumonia of known cause’ in China that had 
already resulted in 27 infections. Using automated 
AI processes applied to online open-source data, 
BlueDot identified the emergence of COVID-19 
almost one week in advance of both the WHO 
and the US Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC). 
The impact: lessons learned 
on incorporating non-expert 
evidence into infectious disease 
practices 
The evolving incorporation of non-expert evidence 
highlighted above, largely in the forms of big data 
sources, have yielded many benefits towards 
the enhancement of public health surveillance 
practices in an era of global pandemic vigilance 
including: a more rapid identification of unusual 
health events; a diversity of data sources in which 
to monitor in real-time the emergence of public 
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health risks; and a timelier exchange of 
strategic data and information to support 
outbreak responses.
However, while digitisation and 
technological advancements have been 
central to the production of more data 
and timelier reporting, digital surveillance 
practices are not a panacea to addressing 
and regulating increasingly prevalent 
public health emergencies. These digital 
surveillance practices must continue to 
operate in tandem with robust healthcare 
systems and investments in systems 
strengthening and response capacities. 
This is particularly important in regard 
to the integration and interoperability of 
these systems into larger global health 
sentinel frameworks. Importantly, as waves 
of digitisation and datafication within the 
surveillance of public health emergencies 
continue to advance at rapid pace, it is 
imperative that ethical, legal and political 
interrogations of these new data sources 
and knowledge-production practices 
continue to follow suit in the tracking of the 
next disease outbreak. 
